Thirty years on from the dramatic and unprecedented AIDS advertising campaign organised by the Conservative administration of the late 1980s, this article reassesses the experience drawing upon subsequent memoirs and interviews. It does so in the context of an emergence of risk politics in the UK in the 1980s, situated within an historical perspective on the development of risk within modernity. Emphasis is placed upon the forgotten pragmatic, amoral core of the campaign which challenged the illiberal climate of the times, and how it was possible for an administration defined by high moralism to challenge it. The range of pressures that led to the campaign are outlined, including a conscious attempt to limit stigmatisation amidst the mood of wartime emergency that prevailed in late 1986/early 1987. Its emergency character meant little direct legacy of harm reduction has endured, but the article argues for a wider significance of the campaign as a key moment in the emergence of risk politics in the UK and beyond.
Introduction: Historical Perspectives and the Emergence of a Politics of Risk
Socially oriented risk research or 'risk studies' has developed but remains a disparate field lacking shape and definition (Burgess, Alemanno and Zinn 2016) . A clearer historical foundation can provide a thread to help cohere the research area. This article suggests that the 'Don't die of ignorance' campaign can usefully be understood in an historical context, as part of a shift towards a politics of risk that emerged first in the United States from the late 1950s, and then in the UK under the Conservative administrations of the 1980s.
The politics of risk involve an expanded social agenda around controlling the future and emphasizing security and precaution (Franklin 1997) . In the famous phrase of Beck (1992: 48), the 'risk society' is concerned with the 'distribution of bads, not goods'; alongside classical political concerns with the distribution and allocation of resources, national security and social order, the avoidance of new potential harms becomes an imperative. In the process, matters of everyday risk and ontological security become politicized, contested and engage the public. This process has not developed evenly or completely, and nor has intellectual attention; whilst developments in the American context are a continuing focus (see for example Mohun 2012; Levy 2012; Vogel 2012) , very little has considered changes in the UK (Giddens 1997; Rayner 2007 ).
The AIDS campaign was one moment in this shift, as lifestyle risk became the subject of direct ministerial engagement and the public were implored to change their behaviour through an evidence-based campaign challenging then still powerful moral antipathy towards homosexuality. Its significance remains unappreciated, however, as the campaign is remembered for its shocking advertisements more than historical novelty and shift from morally-determined to risk-driven politics. Before exploring the dynamics of the campaign, weI will establish that a general historical perspective is important to the sociological engagement with risk but did not extend to consider contemporary changes within the 'risk society'. Further, risk politics were not preordained general developments of the kind described in sociological theory but involve complex interplay and influential actors sometimes pushing against predominant assumptions, requiring the kind of detailed analysis of the AIDS campaign that form the core of this article.
A long-term historical perspective was central to the modern foundation of sociological risk theory in the 1980s, where modernity was seen as synonymous with a secular orientation towards the future. The fate, luck and fortune that dominated pre-modern societies was eroded and marginalised, and Giddens (1991: 145) suggests the domination of the abstract system of risk calculation meant the 'evaporation of morality'. This transition was not an overnight or complete break with the past, however, particularly at an uneven, global level.
There was some attempt in early sociological work to indicate turning points in this ongoing process of a shift from pre-modern fatalism to modern probabilistic thinking and practice. Giddens (1991: 110) identified a partial intellectual challenge to fatalism in the notion of fortuna advanced by Niccolo Machiavelli, during the Renaissance. Early modern marine insurance is classically identified as the starting point of risk thinking and practice, where the fate of ships' cargo was no longer left to the 'gods' but became the subject to the calculation of an insurance contract, thus 'taming' the future (Levy 2012) .
The interpretation and management of particular events mark further turning points, where the consolidation of underlying shifts away from fatalism become apparent. Natural disasters and disease outbreaks that historically would have been interpreted as divine punishment began to be understood in secular, causal terms. A widely-recognised departure occurred with the intellectual response to the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, when belief in disaster as an expression of divine agency faltered. Rather than being: 'singular curiosities imbued with religious or political significance', they became the object of scientific investigation -a hazard whose probability of eruption could be, to some extent, calculated, anticipated and managed (Janku, Schenk and Mauelshagen 2012: 6) . Giddens' suggestion that fatalism and morality have subsequently simply 'evaporated' is an ideal type simplification. Even within contemporary 'risk society', 'morality policy' remains intact around issues regarded as of first principle rather than instrumental issues of policy design (Knil 2013) . Despite being formally determined in 'evidence-based' terms, UK drugs policy, for example, remains effectively a 'morality policy'. Illustrating this, policy advisor David Nutt (2009) was sacked for insisting upon the calculation of relative harms, challenging its basis in the anticipation of public outrage, arguing that alcohol was a greater risk than illegal drugs. There are further points of change, transition and resistance which can be usefully delineated in the contemporary period of risk politics. (Lytle 2007 164) . Likewise, the UK AIDS campaign was driven by particular individuals and contested agendas, albeit under more demonstrably urgent conditions.
The AIDS campaign was part of a more general reorientation towards managing risk initiated in the Tory administrations of the later 1980s and 1990s. Most immediately, a series of major accidents and disasters -at football grounds and train stations, on ferries and oil rigs -struck in the late 1980s and 1990s which became defined as risks that could have been avoided, leading to public inquiries intended to prevent recurrence (Burgess 2012) . 'Blame would once have been diffused, to local authorities, nationalized industries, private operators, even that old standby, acts of God,' notes Simon Jenkins (2006: 137) in his account of the period, 'But after a decade of personalized public administration, she who had craved so much of the credit now had to take the blame'. The Conservative administrations found themselves grappling towards new responses to issues that appeared to potentially threaten public health and safety in a changing climate of growing health preoccupation, less deference and a more defensive political class unfamiliar with such terrain. The climate was unpredictable as even issues that in the past that would not have been understood to merit a national government response, such as salmonella food poisoning, acquired a dynamic and became politicized.
In an environment of perceived greater public anxiety about health and security ministers experimented with a more pro-active, anticipatory approach to what appeared to be new issues of public concern. Edwina Currie was a central figure in the AIDS drama as junior Health Minister, and pioneered a new engagement with, rather than denial of, risk. The year after the height of the AIDS campaign, in 1988, Currie announced on television news that, 'We do warn people now that most of the egg production in this country, sadly, is now affected with salmonella' (Booker and North 2007: 36) . Her comments led to the temporary collapse of the egg industry, her own sacking, and went further in establishing a sense that taken-for-granted aspects of everyday life -first sex, now food -were fraught with danger. Others, like dog ownership, were to follow. Another significant moment in the advance of a new risk politics was in August 1991 when, in a blaze of publicity, the then Home Secretary, Kenneth Baker, announced the Dangerous Dogs Act, in response to a single, highly publicized dog attack on a child. Thus, began another dimension to the newly evolving risk focus in British life; the over-responsive, 'something must be done' action to eradicate everyday risks, that followed media campaigning (Burgess 2010) .
It was particularly within the field of health policy directly that a more proactive approach to everyday risk further evolved and questions of individual responsibility for lifestyle choices elevated. A new era in the evolution of public health, now known as 'health promotion' began in the 1990s and has subsequently intensified (Awofeso 2004 (Hansard 1986) . There was a wider sense of uncertainty as medical authorities had little knowledge of the sexual habits of high risk groups and the potential for further spread into the heterosexual population, as occurred in the developing world (Epstein 2007) . Even if it were to be confined to the male gay population there was no accurate data on their numbers or habits (Overy, Reynolds and Tansey 2009:8) . It is also important to bear in mind the general ignorance and incomprehension that prevailed at this time about gay lifestyles;
Norman Fowler (2015) himself later recalled how he had to be educated about them, and the lack of knowledge was an important aspect of the uncertainty about the likely patterns of disease spread. In addition, it began to emerge that it was not just male homosexual who were 'at risk'. By mid-1983 it had become clear that haemophiliacs were contracting the disease, and while the media could attribute infection amongst homosexual men to immoral behaviour, haemophiliacs were clearly 'innocent victims' infected by contaminated blood supplied through state agencies, a problem that occurred internationally (Berner 2007) . In any case, blood dominated public perception at this time and led to a widening sense of who might be at risk from AIDS.
Alongside this, and of greater professional concern, news arrived of much higher and, This new evidence was important in swaying the campaign towards a general population campaign -rather than the earlier separate campaigns for homosexual and heterosexual.
Whilst Acheson made clear that epidemic was likely to develop more slowly in UK than in Africa, he argued it still constituted a real emergency under the prevailing conditions of uncertainty and this justified a population-wide campaign. In the November emergency debate in Parliament, Norman Fowler explained that the campaign:
must be directed at the general population rather than at the groups which currently had the highest incidence in order to prevent an American or African type of situation in the UK…balance had to be struck between warning everyone without causing unnecessary panic (Hansard 1986 ).
Even in the midst of a 'warlike' response, there remained a degree of paternalistic restraint, however, indicated by the government's rejection of the 'anyone can get it' messages originally suggested by the advertising agency put in charge of the campaign.
There were other factors beyond the character of the disease itself that explain the extent and character of the reaction. Likely projections of the disease toll based on American trends don't easily explain the reaction as these didn't suggest a populationwide epidemic. Other imperatives were at play, reflected in the intrinsically odd slogan, 'Don't die of ignorance' -something which nobody had ever, or was ever likely to do, in any literal sense. The slogan emphasised education through attacking 'ignorance' as important as the disease itself. At the time of the campaign, even professionals such as nurses believed that the disease could be spread by everyday contact, and threatened to refuse treatment and contact as a result. Ignorance encourages fear and the government reaction was more broadly informed by concern with how public fear may make treatment of this 'minority' disease more difficult and even threaten 'moral panic'. Whilst the spectre of a widespread anti-homosexual backlash may seem fanciful in 2016, 1986 was a very different time and place in the UK.
There was the sense of an impending 'plague' in 1986-7. Just as difficult to now recall in a Britain with legalised gay marriage that's relatively at ease with public discussion of sexuality, was the extent of hostility towards homosexuality and, more broadly, the general ignorance of sex that still prevailed in the 1980s. This dimension leads to reflecting back upon an equally important, but largely forgotten dimension of the campaign. Homosexuality remained stigmatized in the UK, even as other aspects of culture had been liberalized and decriminalized in the 1960s (Davies 1975 telling people that some sexual practices were morally reprehensible, and almost a third said that the disease was a 'punishment to the world for the decline in moral standards'.
The proportion of those who considered that homosexuality was 'always or mostly wrong'
rose from 62% to 74%. In this sense, the notorious Section 28 of Local Government Act, passed in 1988, preventing councils from 'promoting' homosexuality was in keeping with the predominant public inclination.
During the week of the leaflet drop, the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester James The other, largely forgotten side of the Conservative AIDS campaign was how it sought to inform and even challenge misconceptions in an open way that was, in its context, quite bold, particularly for a Conservative administration. Recalling the main campaign slogan, this was a campaign formulated against 'ignorance' -something which one could 'die of'.
Alongside the dramatic and arguably misleading television adverts the leaflet delivered to householders carefully debunked myths about how HIV could be contracted and explained that whilst mainly confined to high risk groups it had the potential to spread more widely, depending upon behaviour. The close working relationship between the principal minister in charge, Norman Fowler, and the chief medical officer indicated how this was a campaign closely informed by developing evidence, as Norman Fowler continued to emphasize both in conversation and in his more recent account of managing AIDS (Fowler 2014) . In today's language it was 'evidence-based' -though partially also driven by policy concern to avoid a backlash against stigmatized groups.
AIDS was managed as a matter of risk, not morality, to be combatted pragmatically not ideologically. Fowler declared in Commons debate that: 'government did not have time for the luxury of a moral argument' (Hansard 1986) . In a different indication of the campaign ethos, the Chief Medical Officer, Donald Acheson (2007: 197) recalled in his memoirs how pleased he was that insurers had been persuaded to simply use an HIV test to set premiums rather than identify those in high risk group through questions about sexual orientation. Acheson endorsed policy based on amoral risk factors rather than potentially discriminatory judgements about lifestyle, though there remained an uneasy tension between the two. With some difficulty the campaign did not even commend sticking to one sexual partner, but rather stated that if an individual had more than one partner they should wear a condom as protection. The emphasis was upon harm reduction rather than moral judgement and this was most clearly illustrated by the introduction of needle exchanges in 1985 to minimize risk to intravenous drug users, in an implicit acceptance of illegal drug addiction still controversial today. Above all, the campaign resisted calls for compulsory screening heard in some section of the Conservative Party and beyond. This was an approach to risk in the more epidemiological and probabilistic sense, rather than only as danger. Practicing safe sex -using condoms and avoiding multiple concurrent partners -was the central message of a campaign that made it commonplace to talk openly about sex for the first time.
Historical and policy analysts see UK AIDS policy as innovative and quite at odds with the moral climate of the time. Patricia Day and Rudolf analysed the response in the context of British state policy making more generally, and argued it exemplified its dynamic rather than static character. They were particularly struck by its ability to engage 'outsiders' from gay groups and clinical specialties, governed by a deferment to expertise. They were further impressed by how little impact the populist moral backlash against homosexuals had on policy making, illuminating the 'power of professionalism'.
Other accounts emphasize the distinctively amoral character of the campaign. Turner's recent account of the 1980s simply stated:
the fact that a Conservative government was prepared to see the problem as being medical rather than moral…was in itself a remarkable development. [Turner (2013: 212) We used it a lot at the UKDPC to try to cut through the liberal polarisation over drugs, reminding Tories that it was their government that brought in harm reduction measures in order to show them they had a legacy to lay claim to in current issues.
(Brown personal correspondence 2016)
Overall, there were two, in some views contradictory, elements to the campaign: an alarmist form and measured, informational content. As part of the British Library's retrospective on propaganda, one academic illustrated this simply through an analysis of the notorious adverts themselves, contrasting their ominous images and dramatic music, with the accompanying calm, sombre voice that simply stated the facts (Graham 2013) .
Criticising their ineffectiveness, she favourably contrasted them with later campaigns that drew upon humour and intimacy, while not ignoring actual AIDS victims in the process.
What is forgotten here, however, is that these later campaigns intended to familiarise the public with condom use were conducted outside the heat of the crisis moment in late 1986
and early 1987. Further, the shocking commercials were intended to be a temporary means of directing more considered attention towards the leaflet drop.
Substantively what is interesting is how in its underpinnings the campaign developed a hybrid approach. In contrast to the United States where a conventional biomedical emphasis on cure and treatment was preferred by activists as it refocused attention away from 'immoral' behaviours, epidemiological notions of 'risk group' remained influential in the UK (Hoppe 2014) . But this had to undergo modification and underplaying given the implications that:
There was…a thin definitional line between the epidemiologists' concept of risk and the lay interpretation in terms of blame and moral responsibility. (Berridge 2002: 31) What emerged was a hybrid approach that emphasised risky behaviours rather than 'at risk' or 'in danger' groups combined with an emphasis upon rights and liberties, cast against the prevailing climate of prejudice. Whilst still strictly accurate (anyone could get AIDS though were unlikely to do so given the sexual practices of the majority), the implication was to cast the net of vulnerability widely with the suggestion -in the adverts particularly -that we were all 'at risk', a phrase and notion of generalised vulnerability that was to become influential more widely in society from this time.
However necessary, the campaign did not sit comfortably with the predominant public mood and a sense of betrayal is evident from Thatcher's fervent constituency. Supporters It is interesting to examine how the Prime Minister was able to square her 'amoral moment' with the prevailing climate and her orientation and why did such a 'remarkable' policy initiative apparently leave so little legacy, with harm reduction approaches in contentious policy arenas remaining marginalized? I will consider these issues in the next section.
Overcoming 'Victorian Values'?
The particular characteristics of the early AIDS epidemic, the lack of a treatment or cure, its uncertainty, its threat to spread to the general population and the 'moral panic' in some sections of the media provided the stimulus for a robust policy response but the course of the campaign was shaped by negotiation and politics.
It is firstly useful to provide some further context and dynamics for the 'scary' side of the campaign, beyond the general resolution to communicate that this was more than just a disease affecting minorities. The 'Don't Die of Ignorance' campaign was not the first UK AIDS initiative. Since the official recognition in 1983 of a new deadly disease that could be sexually transmitted, the UK government had experimented with public information campaigns using traditional communication techniques such as booklets and telephone hotlines. However the campaign led to only 2,500 requests for the government booklet and 6,000 helpline calls. These early initiatives were criticised for their obscurity and lack of impact. They were too 'wishy washy' and psychologist David Miller reflected an emerging consensus that: 'Unfortunately some people will have to be shocked if we are This was intended to reassure the right of the conservative party of a return to Thatcherism in the 'small state', rather than 'big morality' sense. But with the unwitting aid of Central Office media managers, the speech was spun by journalists into a moral crusade, 'thereby rendering any departure from those basics a matter of supposedly legitimate public interest' (Bale 2011: 46) . In this context innocuous-sounding 'old values'
were assumed to belie a more exclusionary purpose.
Thatcher herself was an economic rather than social conservative and uncertain about the rightful scope of the government in moral domains and its chances of success.
The longer term historical UK perspective -including the actual Victorian period -provides further context, indicating that the campaign was less of an historical break and more consistent with established patterns than might be supposed. Thatcher's values of thrift and responsibility were the 'real' Victorian morality, not the one imagined by some opponents as a convenient caricature. Far from being religiously intense in the manner of the Puritans, Victorian morality itself was increasingly secular. Secularised Victorian morality established an instrumental and utilitarian dimension that set it on a modern trajectory. Their morality of respectability was pervasive but also very practical, even banal. The famous quote of German historian, Treitschke, that the English 'think soap is next to civilization' testified to a wider truth that, for Victorians, 'cleanliness was next to
Godliness', as the aphorism went. Correspondingly, the medical historian Roy Porter (1986) noted how a punitive approach to the management of disease was already in decline by the beginning of the Twentieth Century. The spectre of widespread disease in the armed forces and society more widely demanded a pragmatic rather than moralistic response and this became the accepted approach within the medical establishment from that time, as historians were to remind politicians during the AIDS crisis.
This is not to say that Thatcher was openly supportive of the new amoral approach. Fowler in San Francisco and elsewhere (Fowler 2015) and to have been motivated by a sense of injustice -that it 'ain't fair', as he puts it -that an issue could be ignored because it mainly affected hidden, minority groups, (Fowler 2015) . Berridge (2002: 76) What this allowed was an unusual political turn towards historical precedent and even historians themselves, and this substantiated the imperative for distancing policy from immediate moral pressures. During the intensity of autumn 1986, politicians called upon medical historians for advice in how disease had been managed in the past, notably Dorothy and Roy Porter, internationally renowned specialists . The Porters' (Porter, 1986 and Porter and Porter, 1988 ) message was clear. They argued that the historical evidence was that punitive and repressive policies simply had not been effective in controlling sexually transmitted disease. Confidentiality rather than quarantine and stigmatization, had helped control syphilis and gonorrhea. The 'enforcement of health' through measures such as the Notification of Diseases acts of 1889 were both ineffective and undesirable.
They argued that there was no reason to think punitive measures would control the AIDS epidemic. This is reflected in the important article Porter (1986) The right wing press in the UK unsurprisingly lacked any historical perspective and saw things very differently. For example the tabloid newspaper, the Sun, campaigned against what they claimed was a government pro-gay conspiracy to fool the British public into believing that AIDS could be contracted by 'normal' heterosexuals (Beharell 1993). Even some of those involved in the policy process thought the threat of AIDS might have been exaggerated by the gay lobby in similar terms after the Winter wartime mood had passed.
As one reported:
Some of the civil servants, I think, became a little wary of the issue. There was a feeling that perhaps they'd been duped: the media had stories about a 'gay conspiracy', which had hyped AIDS to be more of an issue than it merited. (cited in Overy, L A Reynolds and E M Tansey 2009: 6).
However there is no evidence of any conspiracy or an idea of how it might have been conceived or executed, and the campaign was relatively open to scrutiny. As I have indicated, the campaign -like any other political development -was a process without allpowerful orchestration. The policy response to AIDS was shaped by a range of factors which made the disease a unique danger. It was a new and incurable deadly disease which could not be managed through conventional public health measures; there was a lack of knowledge about the sexual and other behaviours that influenced the spread of AIDS; there was evidence that it was spreading rapidly in general populations in subSaharan Africa; and conventional public health campaigns had made little impact on public awareness. The campaign was shaped by a unique coalition of politicians that were willing to take action, the gay community that received itself to be under threat, public health experts alert to the danger of a new disease and an advertising firm that was willing and able to create a hard hitting campaign. Invoking a wartime spirit this coalition was able to create a risk-based policy which sanctioned state intervention in intimate personal behaviour in a political context which appeared to favour a more moral and repressive approach based on segregation and stigmatisation
A Limited Legacy, but Broader Significance in the Emergence of Risk Politics
The direct impact, significance and legacy of the 'remarkable' 'Don't Die of Ignorance' campaign has been limited. As I have observed, current drugs campaigners seek to remind the Conservatives of some kind of legacy of harm reduction precisely because there hasn't been one. The consumption of illicit psychoactive drugs remains governed by moral politics and even a self-evidently beneficial harm reducing measure such as encouraging smokers to switch to e-cigarettes remains contested as a potentially dangerous compromise (Klein 2013) The AIDS campaign is a curiously forgotten episode -besides the ominous adverts with which nobody is keen to identify and are regarded as, at best, a necessary evil in the face of a unique threat. This is despite standing out objectively as, at the very least, an uncharacteristic intervention and, for some, Thatcher's finest hour. Yet it is not remembered as her 'gay marriage moment' equivalent to Cameron's, not least as she personally distanced herself from the policy. It was not only absent from Thatcher's own memoirs, but even from those of Matthew Parris (2013) , her openly gay and socially liberal former correspondence secretary. In this context, we can understand Norman Fowler's somewhat frustrated attempts to remind us of the experience in his recent book and underline a pioneering legacy for himself and Donald Acheson. Edwina Currie also recalled it as a moment of which the Conservatives should be proud. In her 1989 memoirs she described how AIDS was not covered up or ignored, but: 'tackled with vigour and vision in this country…nipped in the bud' (Currie 1989: 67) . She emphasised how confidently conservative health ministers had responded to a crisis in conditions of uncertainty, as their: 'leap in the dark was taken with a sure-footedness which augurs well for the future'. The campaign was indeed quite bold, particularly with regards to its unprecedented leaflet drop to all households nationally. It was also educational and based on a trust in the public as citizens who had the, capacity to understand sexual matters if
given the information and the will to take actions to protect themselves. Perhaps this contrasts with the distrust that underpins some current policy initiatives that envisage that we can only be unconsciously 'nudged' towards better outcomes (Burgess 2012) . It eschewed moralism and remained substantially evidence-based even if it avoided addressing the specific risks facing specific vulnerable groups such as gay men and concentrating on the general risk facing the whole population , as they were compelled towards a general population campaign. It was driven by Fowler's compassion and concern that minority victims would not be further stigmatised in an illiberal, even vicious cultural climate.
Given the political significance of the 1980s AIDS campaign it seems strange that it did not bequeath a wider legacy of explicitly evidence-based and harm reducing interventions.
One reason for the lack of legacy is that the campaign was not founded in these terms it was seen at the time as a unique response to a unique circumstance in which policy makers did not have time to moralize but had to create immediate and practical solutions to a potentially catastrophic threat. This did not mean that harm reduction became a preferred policy approach or that moralizing had been abandoned, as the Section 28 antigay legislation passed in the following year suggested (there is an unexplored argument here that Section 28 can be understood as a sop to the Conservative's natural constituency, reassuring them that they had not 'gone soft' on homosexuality despite the AIDS intervention). Instead, the AIDS campaign was driven by a combination of distinctive pressures that overcame the usual concerns with appeasing perceived public and media anxiety about liberalization that still limit harm reducing initiatives in sensitive moral areas like drug reform. It was then steered through government insulated by a Cabinet subcommittee, away from potentially hostile critics such as the Prime Minster, Margaret
Thatcher. Perhaps most importantly, once the sense of crisis vanished it was looked back upon with some bemusement, even embarrassment as an aberration, perhaps even a moment when government and civil servants had been somehow hoodwinked, affirming the sustained critique of the Sun newspaper. Otherwise, what remained in the memory were only the adverts, which nobody was keen to claim as a legacy or blueprint for future interventions. In this context, the practical, harm reducing character of the intervention and its contribution towards recasting a more liberal Britain have been forgotten.
It is difficult to assess the direct impact of the campaign. Donald Acheson (2007), the Chief Medical Officer at the time, was balanced in his assessment; that whilst they had 'done the right thing', it wasn't 'remarkable' in comparative terms. For him, the campaign: 'stood the country in good stead...', and the impact was largely proportionate to the UK's relative risk exposure. Whilst the disease impact was:
not as low as occurs in the Scandinavian countries, it is lower than any other country with a colonial history in Africa and the epidemic due to intravenous drug abuse has been avoided'. (Acheson 2007: 197) This matter of fact and practical assessment is in keeping with the character of the campaign behind the adverts, usefully contextualizing national impacts within the UK's historic ties with, and large numbers of immigrants from, what emerged as the African centre of the epidemic. The needle exchange programme and other initiatives among drug addicts were a notable credit, though these predated and were separate from the 'Don't die of ignorance' campaign itself.
In comparative international context, it would be wrong to overstate the uniqueness of the UK response to AIDS. Similarly 'professional' responses were evident in Sweden, Germany and even, to some degree, in the United States, as other countries also perceived a potential crisis and also responded clearly -some more quickly, others regrettably more slowly (Fox, Day and Klein 1989 In Germany political uncertainty produced a conflict between authoritarian and liberal ideologies; in the UK, uncertainty seems to have increased political reliance on professional knowledge and expertise. (Freeman 1992: 57) Within the campaign there began a long, painful and still continuing journey to politically manage crisis amidst uncertainty. A significant moment was initial official reluctance to admit that AIDS could be transmitted through blood on the basis that, as the then Secretary for State, Kenneth Clarke put it, 'there is no conclusive proof that this is so', as Edwina Currie later recalled. She intellectually recognised the importance of challenging this outmoded denial of uncertainty, and recalled challenging the logic that 'no evidence (yet) means no risk' during parliamentary questioning. She remembered it as a moment of epiphany, one: 'I shan't ever forget…it's engraved on my heart.' Frankly, she continued that:
I suppose, if I'm being totally honest, there's also the thought that if one of these liability cases goes badly wrong it could just be me that has to defend, sometime in the future. (Currie 2002: 53) .
Currie admitted that her care not to deny as yet uncertain risk was driven not only by foresight and recognition of the need for a new political style, but concern with avoiding direct responsibility and future blame. This message was only to really hit home with the Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis (mad cow disease) debacle of the later 1990s, however, after which ensuring that, above all, perhaps inevitable political mistakes around such 'wicked problems' of uncertainty don't happen 'on my watch' (Burgess 2004 ).
Looking at the wider impact of the population-wide campaign, the consensus is that there was no fundamental behavioural shift towards 'safe sex' with condoms amongst the heterosexual population (Graham 2013) . As there was no take-off in HIV infection among heterosexuals outside high risk groups the disease remained only frightening in the abstract. 'Scare tactics' do not stimulate positive behaviour change (see Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino and Finckenauer 2000) . The population-wide campaign also necessarily took attention away from the mainly-gay victims of the disease who remained publicly invisible apart from high profile celebrity deaths such as that of Freddie Mercury in 1991
and Rudolf Nureyev in 1993 (Graham 2013) . But the campaign did raise general awareness that the disease was contracted sexually rather than through everyday contact, as was previously widely assumed. And there's reason to believe it contributed towards a blunting of anti-gay prejudice, marking a turning point in creating the more socially liberal values prevalent today. As Berridge concludes:
As well as advancing a liberal and non-punitive reaction to the syndrome, the Thatcher government effectively presided over a resurgence and reaffirmation of homosexuality, as well, to a lesser extent, an assertion of liberal attitudes towards drug use. (Berridge, 2002: 56) Whilst certainly not the only factor in a broader process of liberalisation, the campaign marked a turning point towards a Britain in which gay marriage could become legalised.
Conclusion
Returning to the broader theme with which we began, the history and increasing encroachment of risk thinking and practice is not only a long-term process driven only by systemic forces of modernisation and secularisation. Nor is it complete or even across the globe, indicating the need to consider developments within particular cultures, national contexts and in relation to particular issues and domains. The threat of epidemic disease which once was predominantly understood in moral and religious terms now tends to be predominantly understood as a risk that might 'tamed'. Early responses to AIDS illustrate the continued struggle to displace explicitly moral and fatalistic responses in an area where such sensibilities remained powerful. In the UK context, it marked the arrival of risk politics and policy making that aspires to govern individual lifestyle risk.
Important shifts and turning points in risk history require closer analysis, allowing better understanding of the balance between continuity and change. The AIDS case illustrates that even significant breaks in the extent and character of government intervention are not without precedent, drawing upon historic policies to manage sexual disease among travelling troops during wartime. The abandonment of a fixed and explicitly moralistic approach was consistent with an increasingly pragmatic and empty formal moralism evident since Victorian times and only apparently revived under Conservative party 'back to basics' from the 1980s. Nor was the sometimes shocking packaging of some of the campaign unprecedented either historically or comparatively. Yet a significant change occurred, with a population-wide campaign intended to change everyday sexual behaviour and self-awareness. The AIDS campaign involved adopting an evidence-based, calculative approach to limit the possibility of further stigmatization and backlash against minority groups. It was led 'from above', driven by the determination of particular individuals drawing upon new alliances, and involving difficult negotiation and resistance.
It is difficult to now recall the novelty of the risk politics that emerged in the late 1980s, in a world where it has become relatively routine. Reducing 'lifestyle risk' for indeterminate ends became matters for the state and government who are expected to concern themselves with promoting the prevention of future risk among the population.
Complaints of a 'nanny state' that should confine itself to its traditional socioeconomic
